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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j).
Margetts first appealed from the final judgment, dated April 23, 1990, of the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. On February 20, 1992, the Court of
Appeals remanded the case to the District Court. A new final judgment was entered by the
District Court on January 11, 1993. Notice of Appeal was filed February 10, 1993. On
July 14, 1993, this case was transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Supreme Court
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE I

DID THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOLLOW THIS COURT'S
MANDATE TO ENTER SUBSIDIARY FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON AGENCY AND FRAUD AND TO
CLARIFY ITS RULING AS TO FORFEITURE AND RENT?
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court followed this Court's
mandate may be reviewed under a correction-of-error standard.

ISSUE II

DID THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINE THAT GERALD
SNOW HAD NO ACTUAL OR APPARENT AUTHORITY TO BIND
AMERICAN SAVINGS TO THE TERMS OF THE TWENTY PERCENT
AGREEMENT?
Standard of Review: This court must uphold the trial court's factual
findings unless appellant, after marshalling all the evidence supporting the
findings, is then able to demonstrate that, even if viewed in the light most
favorable to the trial court, the evidence is legally insufficient to support the
trial court's findings such that those findings are clearly erroneous. Due
regard should be given to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility
of the witnesses. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989);
-ix-
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Slattery v. Covey & Co., Inc., 216 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 28 (Utah App. 1993);
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).
ISSUE III

DID THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDE THAT
AMERICAN SAVINGS WAS NOT A PARTY TO OR OTHERWISE
BOUND BY THE TWENTY PERCENT AGREEMENT?
Standard of Review: The trial court ruled as a matter of law that the
agreements were complete and unambiguous on their face. See Morris v.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 658 P.2d 1199, 1200 (Utah 1983) ("whether
a contract is ambiguous is a question of law which the court must decide").
The trial court's legal conclusion that the agreements were complete and
unambiguous is reviewed under the correction of error standard. State v.
Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 154-55 (Utah App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds 796
P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). The trial court's ruling that American Savings did not
assume Terrace Falls' liabilities involved mixed issues of law and fact; the
legal conclusions involved in this ruling are subject to review under the
correction of error standard while the factual findings are reviewed under a
clearly erroneous standard. State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1300 n.7 (Utah
App. 1991).

ISSUE IV

DID THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINE THAT NO
FRAUD OR OTHER IMPROPER CONDUCT WAS COMMITTED
WHICH WOULD PERMIT MARGETTS TO RESCIND HIS
AGREEMENT WITH AMERICAN SAVINGS OR THE RELEASE OF
HIS LIEN ON THE TERRACE FALLS PROJECT?
Standard of Review: The trial court's factual findings regarding fraud
must be affirmed unless they are clearly erroneous. Doelle, 784 P.2d at 1178;
Slattery, 216 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28.

ISSUE V

WAS IT PROPER TO AWARD RENT AND DECLARE A FORFEITURE
OF MARGETTS' RIGHTS TO THE CONDOMINIUM WHERE
MARGETTS WRONGFULLY RETAINED POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY AFTER REFUSING TO HONOR THE PURCHASE
AGREEMENT?
Standard of Review: The trial court's legal conclusions may be
reviewed under a correction-of-error standard. Vigil, 815 P.2d at 1300.
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ISSUE VI

IS A DISAFFIRMING BUYER WHO WRONGFULLY RETAINS
POSSESSION OF PROPERTY AFTER A DEMAND TO VACATE
LIABLE FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER?
Standard of Review: The trial court's legal conclusions may be
reviewed under a correction-of-error standard. Vigil, 815 P.2d at 1300.

ISSUE VII

WAS THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF FAIR RENTAL VALUE
ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE?
Standard of Review: This Court must uphold the trial court's findings
regarding fair rental value unless they are clearly erroneous. Doelle, 784 P.2d
at 1178; Slattery, 216 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28.

ISSUE VIII
A.

DID NEW WEST COMPLY WITH THE PROCEDURAL
REQUIREMENTS OF THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER STATUTE?

B.

IS MARGETTS PRECLUDED FROM RAISING THIS ISSUE ON
APPEAL BECAUSE HE FAILED TO ASSERT THE DEFENSE IN
THE TRIAL COURT?

Standard of Review: If this Court reaches the merits, the trial court's
legal conclusions may be reviewed under a correction-of-error standard. Vigil,
815 P.2d at 1300.
ISSUE IX

DID THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARD ATTORNEYS' FEES
TO NEW WEST?
Standard of Review: If this Court reaches the merits, the trial court's
legal conclusions may be reviewed under a correction-of-error standard. Vigil,
815 P.2d at 1300.

ISSUE X

DID THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARD PREJUDGMENT
INTEREST TO NEW WEST?
Standard of Review: If this Court reaches the merits, the trial court's
legal conclusions may be reviewed under a correction-of-error standard. Vigil,
815 P.2d at 1300.
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STATUTES AND RULES TO BE INTERPRETED
§ 78-36-3, Utah Code Annotated
(See p. 28 for full text).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
New West agrees with Margetts' statement of the nature of the case.
Course of the Proceedings
New West agrees with Margetts' statement of the course of the proceedings.
Disposition in Lower Court
On remand, the parties prepared and submitted to the court detailed
submissions in support of proposed supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Both parties' submissions contained numerous references to the trial transcript and to case
authorities. New West's additional submissions appear at R. 705-829; Margetts' submissions
appear at R. 551-703. The court heard oral argument on supplemental findings of fact and
conclusions of law on September 28, 1992. A transcript of the hearing, including the
Court's bench ruling, appears at R. 888-932. The court entered its Supplemental Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Supplemental Findings") on October 26, 1992, at R. 851862. A copy of the Supplemental Findings is attached hereto as Addendum A. The
Supplemental Findings incorporated the court's earlier Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law ("Findings"), which appear at R. 512-524. A copy of the Findings is attached hereto as
Addendum B. On January 11, 1993, the court entered a new final judgment in favor of New
West, at R. 872-874.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Margetts owned a condominium in Park City which he traded in 1981 for the
right to receive another condominium in a project to be built in Salt Lake City (the
"Project"). (Tr. 26, 30.) Margetts obtained a lien against the Project to secure his right to
receive the new condominium. {Id.)
In 1981, Gerald Snow began serving as counsel for Terrace Falls
Condominiums Partnership ("Terrace Falls"), which owned the Project. (Tr. 25.) As
attorney for Terrace Falls, Snow drafted the original condominium purchase agreement
between Margetts and Terrace Falls. (Tr. 33-34.)
In December 1981, Snow represented Terrace Falls in obtaining a construction
loan for the Project from New West's predecessor, American Savings. (Tr. 26-31.) As part
of his efforts to help Terrace Falls obtain the construction loan, Snow met with Margetts and
his attorney, Ralph Marsh, and obtained the subordination of Margetts' lien to the
construction financing. (Tr. 29-33.) On that occasion, Snow advised Margetts and Marsh
that he was representing Terrace Falls. (Tr. 31-32, 109-111.)
When Terrace Falls defaulted on the construction loan in 1984, Snow, in his
capacity as attorney for Terrace Falls, began negotiating a loan workout with American
Savings. (Tr. 36-41.) American Savings retained the local firm Kirton, McConkie &
Bushnell as counsel in these negotiations. (Tr. 39-40, 59, 283.)
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In September of 1984, American Savings agreed to accept a deed in lieu of
foreclosure from Terrace Falls provided that Terrace Falls could deliver free and clear title
to the Project. (Tr. 39-41, 49, Plaintiffs Trial Ex. 9.) To clear title, Snow began
negotiating with Terrace Falls' lien creditors, including Margetts, to obtain lien releases.
(Tr. 39, 53, 56-59.) Because Terrace Falls was insolvent, American Savings agreed to front
the costs of reaching settlements with the lien holders. (Tr. 49; Plaintiffs Trial Ex. 4, p. 8,
1 4.E.)
Snow first contacted Margetts regarding the 1984 negotiations through a letter
to Marsh dated September 7, 1984. (Tr. 56; Plaintiffs Trial Ex. 5.) The letter, a copy of
which is attached hereto as Addendum C, explained that Terrace Falls was attempting to
negotiate a deed in lieu of foreclosure with American Savings and that such an arrangement
would require "an acceptable settlement with all the junior lienholders." (Id.) The letter
identified Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell as local counsel for American Savings. (Id.)
Nothing in the letter suggested that Snow was representing anyone other than Terrace Falls.
(Id.)
The following week, Margetts and Marsh attended a meeting with Terrace
Falls and American Savings at the offices of Kirton, McConkie and Bushnell, American
Savings' local counsel. (Tr. 60, 244, 264.) During the meeting, Snow informed Margetts
that if American Savings foreclosed on the Project, Margetts would receive nothing and his
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lien position would be wiped out. (Tr. 61.) Snow offered Margetts $30,000 for a release of
his lien on the Project, but Margetts rejected the offer. {Id.)
During the ensuing negotiations, which culminated in November, 1984, Snow
never told Margetts or Marsh that he was representing American Savings. (Tr. 79-80, 109111.) Margetts and Marsh both admit this fact. (Tr. 248, 266.) Margetts also admits that
he never inquired as to whom Snow was representing. {Id.) During the negotiations,
Margetts' only contact with American Savings was the initial September meeting at Kirton,
McConkie & Bushnell. (Tr. 244-47.) No one at that meeting told Margetts that Snow was
representing American Savings. (Tr. 248.)
Throughout the fall of 1984, Snow negotiated settlements and releases with
Terrace Falls' lien creditors. (Tr. 53.) Snow also drafted the settlement agreements and
obtained signatures on the settlement documents from Terrace Falls' lien creditors. {Id.)
Throughout these negotiations, Snow represented only Terrace Falls. (Tr. 55.) In engaging
in those activities, Snow was serving the interests of Terrace Falls, which directly benefited
from the transaction by avoiding the adverse consequences of a foreclosure. (Supp.
Findings, f LA. 12.) Snow never intended to represent American Savings, nor did he believe
that he was representing American Savings in these negotiations. (Tr. 80.) Snow assumed
that Margetts knew that he continued to represent Terrace Falls, not American Savings.
(Tr. 110.)
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Ultimately, Margetts was offered a nonrefundable $150,000 credit towards the
purchase of a condominium in the Project in return for Margetts' release of his lien on the
Project. Margetts accepted this offer. (Tr. 66.) To consummate that agreement, Margetts
and American Savings executed a Condominium Purchase Agreement (Plaintiff's Trial Ex. 7;
attached hereto as Addendum D), a General Release (Plaintiff's Trial Ex. 8), and a Request
for Reconveyance (Plaintiff's Trial Ex. 9). By these documents, Margetts agreed to purchase
a condominium, American Savings granted Margetts a nonrefundable $150,000.00 credit
towards the purchase, and Margetts released his lien on the Project. (Id.)
When Margetts executed the above agreements, he also executed an agreement
with Terrace Falls called the "Twenty Percent Agreement" (Defendant's Trial Ex. 10;
attached hereto as Addendum E). American Savings was not a party to the Twenty Percent
Agreement. (Id.) It provided that Margetts was entitled to twenty percent of any proceeds
from the Project that Terrace Falls might receive after executing the Deed in Lieu
Agreement. The purpose of the Twenty Percent Agreement was to permit Margetts to
participate in any windfall profits the Project developers might receive after American
Savings took over the Project. (Tr. 70.)
Snow did not state to Margetts that American Savings would become Terrace
Falls or would otherwise succeed to Terrace Falls' legal duties under the Twenty Percent
Agreement. (Tr. 136-137.) American Savings' representatives were not involved in the
negotiation or execution of the Twenty Percent Agreement, and never represented to
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Margetts that American Savings would be bound by the Twenty Percent Agreement.
(Tr. 71, 140.)
Throughout the time he was negotiating lien creditor settlements for Terrace
Falls, Snow sent to American Savings or its attorneys, for their review and approval, drafts
of all settlement documents that he believed would create a legal obligation on the part of
American Savings. (Tr. 82.) Snow never presented the Twenty Percent Agreement to
American Savings for final review and approval. Snow did not intend that agreement to
create a legal duty on the part of American Savings. (Tr. 71, 140.) Neither American
Savings nor its attorneys saw the Twenty Percent Agreement before it was executed by
defendant Margetts and Terrace Falls. (Tr. 71, 286.) American Savings never ratified the
Twenty Percent Agreement, nor did American Savings or New West agree to accept Terrace
Falls' liabilities under the Twenty Percent Agreement. (Supp. Findings f I.A. 19.)
American Savings never gave Snow permission to enter into any agreements on behalf of
American Savings. (Tr. 285-286).
Because Terrace Falls lacked funds to pay Snow's attorney's fees for his work
on behalf of Terrace Falls to complete the construction loan workout, American Savings
agreed to pay Snow's attorney's fees as it paid other Terrace Falls creditors. (Tr. 50 and
51.) There was no evidence that Margetts was aware that American Savings had agreed to
pay Snow's attorney's fees. (Supp. Findings f LA. 18.)
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In August of 1985, Margetts took possession of Terrace Falls condominium
number 413. In August of 1987, American Savings demanded that Margetts close on his
purchase pursuant to the Condominium Purchase Agreement. (Tr. 179-183.) Margetts
refused to close on the purchase and began demanding that he be given the unit without
further payment. {Id.) On March 7, 1989, New West served Margetts with a Notice to Quit
by certified mail in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-36-3 and 6. (R. 6, 32, Tr. 183.)
On March 15, 1989, New West commenced this lawsuit alleging breach of contract and
unlawful detainer. (R. 9.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly carried out its mandate on remand by carefully
considering the record, entering supplemental findings and conclusions on agency and fraud
and clarifying its reasons for declaring a forfeiture and awarding rent. The record
overwhelmingly supports the trial court's findings that Terrace Falls' attorney had no actual
or apparent authority to bind American Savings to the terms of the Twenty Percent
Agreement. The trial court correctly concluded that American Savings was not a party to or
otherwise bound by the Twenty Percent Agreement. No one told Margetts that American
Savings would be bound by the Twenty Percent Agreement and, based upon his extensive
dealings with Terrace Falls, Margetts could not have been mislead by any such alleged
statements.
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Margetts is liable for the fair rental value of the property during the period he
wrongfully retained possession after repudiating his contract. His forfeiture of the
$150,000.00 credit resulted solely from his own voluntary refusal to honor the purchase
agreement. There is nothing unjust in allowing New West to recover fair rental value during
the period it was wrongfully denied possession of its property.
The remaining issues should be summarily affirmed in New West's favor.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOLLOWED THIS COURT'S MANDATE
ON REMAND.
This Court's earlier decision requested elaboration of the trial court's Findings

on the issues of agency and fraud. The Court also requested clarification on the combination
of remedies employed by the trial court, i.e., termination of Margetts' rights under the
Condominium Purchase Agreement coupled with an award of rent.
At the outset, it is important to note that this Court did not in any way suggest
that the trial court's earlier Findings were erroneous or unsupported by the evidence. The
Court reversed only on the issue of agency, and only because it believed additional findings
were needed:
[W]e reverse on the issue of Snow's agency since the trial court did not
make sufficient findings for us to review. We, therefore, remand this
case to the trial court for additional findings, both as to the issues of
agency and fraud, with leave to conduct such further proceedings as the
trial court may deem appropriate.
Memorandum Decision, pp. 5-6.
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Every one of the trial court's Supplemental Findings is directly supported by
the testimony and is documented by citations to the record. They are not "merely an
exercise in bolstering and supporting the conclusion already reached". This Court's
admonition to avoid "mere bolstering" was not a direction to the trial court to arrive at a
different result in the case. Rather, it was simply a reminder that the subsidiary findings
must be supported by the record, as were the earlier findings.
Initially, the trial court entered the core findings that Margetts could not have
been wrongfully mislead in the Terrace Falls transaction because: 1) he recognized that
American Savings was not a party to the Twenty Percent Agreement; 2) he did not ask that
Snow's alleged representations be put in writing; 3) no one ever told him Snow had authority
to bind American Savings; 4) he never asked whether Snow had authority to bind American
Savings; and 5) even though he was represented by an attorney in the transaction, he chose
not to consult the attorney regarding American Savings' role in the Twenty Percent
Agreement. (Findings, f 1.1-26.)
On remand, the trial court requested and received detailed submissions from
the parties regarding proposed supplemental findings. (R. 551-703, 705-829.) After
carefully considering these detailed submissions and hearing arguments from both sides, the
trial court entered its Supplemental Findings, and a Bench Decision (R. 919-931) further
explaining its reasoning. As will appear in the following sections of this brief, the
Supplemental Findings include the "subsidiary facts" necessary to "disclose the steps by
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which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached". Memorandum Decision,
p. 4. In addition, the trial court clarified its reasons for declaring forfeiture and awarding
rent. See, Section V, below. Accordingly, the trial court fully carried out this Court's
mandate on remand.

II.

THE RECORD OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDINGS THAT GERALD SNOW HAD NO AUTHORITY TO BIND
AMERICAN SAVINGS TO THE TERMS OF THE TWENTY PERCENT
AGREEMENT,
A.

The Trial Court Found that Snow Lacked Actual or Apparent Authority
to Represent American Savings.
Margetts challenges the trial court's extensive factual findings that Gerald

Snow had no actual or apparent authority to bind American Savings to the terms of the
Twenty Percent Agreement. As an appellant challenging factual findings, Margetts "faces a
substantial burden. Trial court's findings of fact will be affirmed if they are 'based on
sufficient evidence, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's
construction.'" Slattery v. Covey & Co., Inc., 216 Utah Adv. Rep 26, 28 (Utah App. 1991)
quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991). To
prevail, Margetts "'must marshall all relevant evidence presented at trial which tends to
support the findings.'" Id. (emphasis in original). Margetts "must then show that these
same findings are 'so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence,
thus making them clearly erroneous.'" Id. at 315 (citations omitted); see also, Doelle v.
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Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d
896, 899 (Utah 1989). Margetts has failed to carry that substantial burden. Margetts' brief
tries to fill the evidentiary gaps with conclusions such as "Snow acted on behalf of American
Savings" or "Snow was authorized by American Savings". The facts from the evidentiary
record do not support these conclusions. Instead, they overwhelmingly support the trial
court's findings of no agency.
At most, Margetts can point to bits and pieces of evidence which hardly make
a case of actual or apparent authority. For example, Margetts points out that Snow
sometimes communicated American Savings' positions regarding the Terrace Falls
transaction and that Snow sometimes delivered documents to Margetts which affected
American Savings' interests in addition to the interests of Snow's client, Terrace Falls.
Finally, Margetts points to the fact that American Savings, as Terrace Falls' lender, was the
source of payment to Terrace Falls' creditors, including Snow and Margetts. Margetts does
not contend, however, that he was aware that American Savings was the source of payment
for Snow.
These bits and pieces of evidence are completely overshadowed by the trial
court's Supplemental Findings in support of its conclusion that Snow had no actual or
apparent authority to represent American Savings:
1.

Snow had served as counsel for Terrace Falls for three years

leading up to the transactions in question. (Supp. Findings f I.A.2.)
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2.

During that period, Snow represented Terrace Falls in dealings

with Margetts, who was aware that Snow was representing Terrace Falls.
{Id. a t t I . A . 3 . )
3.

When the negotiations began for the transaction in question,

Snow wrote Margetts' attorney a letter identifying Kirton, McConkie &
Bushnell as American Savings' counsel. Nothing in the letter suggested that
Snow was representing anyone other than Terrace Falls. {Id. at f LA.8.)
4.

Margetts admits that no one told him that Snow was

representing American Savings. {Id. at f LA. 10.)
5.

American Savings never gave Snow permission to enter into

agreements on its behalf. {Id. at f LA. 17.)
6.

No one at American Savings saw the Twenty Percent Agreement

before it was executed. {Id. at f LA. 16.)
7.

Snow never believed that he was representing American

Savings. {Id. at 1f LA. 12.)
8.

Snow never intended to bind American Savings to the Twenty

Percent Agreement. {Id. at 1 LA. 15.)
These facts and others included in the trial court's Supplemental Findings (with citations to
the record) conclusively demonstrate that no agency existed.
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B.

The Trial Court Correctly Concluded as a Matter of Law that No Agency
Existed.
An agent cannot bind his principal unless the agent is acting pursuant to actual

or apparent authority. Municipal Building Authority v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273, 279 (Utah
1985). A finding of actual authority is precluded in this case because the undisputed
evidence shows that American Savings never authorized Snow to act as its agent or attorney.
Snow himself testified that he never intended to represent American Savings, and that he
always represented Terrace Falls. (Tr. 55.)
Margetts' theory of apparent authority is similarly deficient. The applicable
case law holds that apparent authority of an agent can be inferred only from the conduct of
the principal. In Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 672 P.2d 73, 75 (Utah 1983) cert. den.
sub nom. Harlan v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 466 U.S. 937 (1984), the Utah Supreme
Court held that apparent authority can exist only when the principal creates an appearance of
circumstances such that it causes a third party to reasonably and prudently believe that a
second party has the power to act on behalf of the principal. See also, City Electric v. Dean
Evans Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1983).
There is no evidence of conduct by American Savings which could support a
claim of apparent authority. Margetts admits he drew his inferences of authority solely from
Snow's conduct. Even Snow's conduct was insufficient to justify a reasonable inference of
authority to act for American Savings. Snow had made known to Margetts his representation
of Terrace Falls in earlier dealings regarding the same condominium unit. Additionally,
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Snow sent Margetts and his attorney a letter (Plaintiff's Trial Ex. 5) regarding the specific
transaction at issue here, stating that Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell represented American
Savings. The unavoidable conclusion to be drawn from the letter was that Snow still
represented Terrace Falls. There is only one legal conclusion possible — Snow did not have
apparent authority to represent American Savings.
Finally, the law in Utah requires a person dealing exclusively with an agent to
take reasonable steps to ascertain the agent's authority despite any representations of the
agent. City Electric, 672 P.2d at 90. Margetts admitted that he never asked Snow if he had
authority to represent American. Margetts admitted that he made no other inquiries as to
Snow's authority. Margetts admitted that he merely assumed from the circumstances that
Snow had authority. These admissions alone compel the conclusion that Snow did not have
apparent authority to represent American.
The cases cited in Margetts' brief do not support a legal conclusion that actual
or apparent agency exists under the facts of this case. Most of the cases cited by Margetts
involve facts and circumstances fundamentally different from those here. For example,
Forsyth v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358 (Utah 1980), Ficke v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 524 P.2d
271 (Ak. 1974) and Gorgoza, Inc. v. Utah State Road Comm., 553 P.2d 413 (Utah 1976)
involved agents who were clearly serving as their principals' attorneys. In the present case,
Snow was not American Savings' attorney, he was Terrace Falls' attorney. Arizona Title
Insurance & Trust Co. v. Pace, 8 Ariz. App. 269, 445 P.2d 471 (1968), heavily relied upon
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by Margetts, is similarly inapplicable because it involved an attorney hired by an insurance
company to represent the insured. In this case, New West did not hire Snow to represent
Terrace Falls. Snow had been representing Terrace Falls all along. Finally, Silver v.
George, 618 P.2d 1157 (Haw. App. 1980) aff'd and remanded, 644 P.2d 955 (Hawaii 1982)
merely holds that an attorney may have a duty to a third party not to draft an usurious or
illegal agreement. There is no claim that the Twenty Percent Agreement was illegal or
usurious. Moreover, there is no showing that Snow was American's attorney in preparing
that document.

in.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT AMERICAN
SAVINGS WAS NOT A PARTY TO OR OTHERWISE BOUND BY THE
TWENTY PERCENT AGREEMENT.
A.

The Condominium Purchase Agreement and the Twenty Percent
Agreement are Unambiguous and Complete on Their Face; Nothing
Indicates That New West is a Party to or Bound By the Twenty Percent
Agreement.
In an attempt to make the Twenty Percent Agreement's terms binding on New

West, Margetts argues that the Twenty Percent Agreement and the Condominium Purchase
Agreement should be read as a single document. This is a misapplication of basic contract
principles.
When interpreting contracts, courts must first look to the four corners of the
agreement to determine the intentions of the parties. Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving v.
Blomquist, 113 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). Extrinsic evidence may not be used to explain
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the terms of a contract that is clear on its face. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292,
1293 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted).
In C.J. Realty, Inc. v. Willey, 758 P.2d 923, 928 (Utah App. 1988), the court
gave a clear and concise definition of an ambiguous contract:
A contract is considered ambiguous if "the words used to express the
meaning and intention of the parties are insufficient in a sense that the
contract may be understood to reach two or more plausible meanings."
Id.
No provision in either the Condominium Purchase Agreement or the Twenty
Percent Agreement is ambiguous as defined by C.J. Realty. The Twenty Percent Agreement
is a one paragraph document. It is between Terrace Falls and Margetts only. American
Savings is not a party. It provides that Margetts has a right to receive twenty percent of any
proceeds received by Terrace Falls' partners after execution of the Deed in Lieu Agreement
resulting from the sale of the Project, from the sale of any interest in the Project or from
other type of Project profits. It provides nothing more. Likewise, the Condominium
Purchase Agreement is a straightforward, garden variety real estate purchase agreement. It
sets forth the terms of Margetts' purchase of the condominium unit from American Savings.
It makes no mention of the Twenty Percent Agreement. Nothing in the two agreements
indicate they should be read as one.
The Condominium Purchase Agreement contains an integration clause. (See
Plaintiff's Trial Ex. 7, f 18.) When an integrated written agreement comprehensively lays

-16s \wcb\18812

out the parties' rights and duties, it is presumed to contain the parties' entire rights and
obligations. Ron Case Roofing, 773 P.2d at 1385.
Since the meaning of both Agreements is unambiguous, oral evidence is not
allowed to contradict their terms. Rowley v. Marrcrest Homeowners Ass'n, 656 P.2d 414,
417 (Utah 1982). Margetts' contention that he was entitled to the unit without any further
payment on his part contradicts the express terms of the Condominium Purchase Agreement.
The Condominium Purchase Agreement makes no mention of setoffs or credits against the
purchase price (except the nonrefundable $150,000 credit expressly provided for). The trial
court refused to allow the Twenty Percent Agreement to modify or contradict the terms of
the Condominium Purchase Agreement. This refusal was a proper application of the parol
evidence rule.
Even if read together, the Twenty Percent Agreement would not modify the
Condominium Purchase Agreement because American Savings was not a party to the Twenty
Percent Agreement. Margetts was only entitled to receive from Terrace Falls twenty percent
of whatever Terrace Falls received after executing the Deed in Lieu Agreement, which
turned out to be nothing.
B.

New West is Not Liable as a Successor-in-interest to Terrace Falls,
Margetts contends that American Savings assumed Terrace Falls' liabilities

under the Twenty Percent Agreement, because it accepted a deed in lieu of foreclosure from
Terrace Falls. Margetts cannot escape the fact that American Savings was not a party to the

-17s:\wcb\18812

Twenty Percent Agreement. Contracts are binding only upon the parties to the contract.
Drummond v. Johnson, 643 P.2d 634, 639 (Okla. 1982). American Savings was not liable
under the Twenty Percent Agreement merely because it benefited from the agreement.
Commercial Fixtures & Furnishings, Inc. v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1977).
Margetts argues that American Savings is liable under the Twenty Percent
Agreement as a successor to Terrace Falls. By accepting the deed in lieu of foreclosure
American Savings did not become Terrace Falls. It merely acquired the Project in
satisfaction of its loan. See Deed in Lieu Agreement, Plaintiff's Trial Ex. 4. It acquired no
other assets of Terrace Falls. The liabilities owed by Terrace Falls to Margetts under the
Twenty Percent Agreement did not run with the land. Margetts' rights under that agreement
were rights in personalty. Terrace Falls' liabilities under the Twenty Percent Agreement
were personal debts and remained with Terrace Falls after American Savings took over the
Project.
Second, even if American Savings (and thus New West) were Terrace Falls'
successor, there are no facts to indicate that American Savings assumed any liability under
the Twenty Percent Agreement. "If a successor does not promise to satisfy its predecessor's
indebtedness or assume the predecessor's obligations, the predecessor's creditors are not
entitled to recover against the successor. Clark County v. Bonanza No. i, 615 P.2d 939,
954 (Nev. 1980). Margetts' assertion that American Savings was obligated to Margetts as a
third party beneficiary fails for the same reason. American Savings never promised to

-18s \wcb\18812

satisfy Terrace Falls' obligations to Margetts under the Twenty Percent Agreement any other
obligations.17 Moreover, Margetts did not assert a third-party beneficiary claim in his
Answer (See Addendum F) or at trial, and is therefore precluded from raising this claim for
the first time on appeal. Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1359 (Utah
App. 1990) cert. den. sub nom..

IV.

THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDING THAT NO FRAUD WAS COMMITTED AGAINST MARGETTS.
In the earlier opinion, this Court recognized that the trial court's findings on

agency would probably determine the outcome on the fraud issues. If Snow were not
American Savings' agent, Margetts cannot possibly prevail on a fraud claim against New
West based upon Snow's alleged misrepresentations. However, this Court stated that it
would be helpful for the trial court to enter subsidiary findings on what Snow said, if
anything, to Margetts regarding American Savings' role under the Twenty Percent
Agreement. Memorandum Decision, p. 5. The trial court found that Snow did not
misrepresent to Margetts that he was American Savings' agent, that American Savings
"would become Terrace Falls" or that American Savings would be bound by the Twenty
Percent Agreement. (Supp. Findings t t LB. 1-6.) The trial court also found that Margetts
could not have reasonably relied on alleged statements by Snow in entering into the

Margetts recites a provision in the Deed in Lieu Agreement where American Savings agrees to front
Terrace Falls' costs in reaching certain specified settlements. Margetts' settlement was not one of them. Instead,
Margetts settlement was handled through separate documents.
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Condominium Purchase Agreement with American Savings or the Twenty Percent Agreement
with Terrace Falls. {Id.)
A.

Except for Margetts' Uncorroborated Testimony. Which the Trial Court
Did not Believe, There Was no Evidence Supporting His Fraud Claim. All
Other Evidence, Including Snow's Testimony, Contradicted Margetts'
Assertions of Fraud.
The claim that Snow misrepresented American Savings' role under the Twenty

Percent Agreement is supported only by Margetts' uncorroborated testimony. Snow
specifically denied making any such misrepresentations. (Tr. 136-137.)
The circumstantial evidence supports Snow's testimony. The position Margetts
claims he was holding out for — a credit of twenty percent of the proceeds from the Project
up to $134,283, in addition to the $150,000 credit already offered by American Savings —
would have resulted in Margetts getting the unit for free, a total capitulation by American
Savings. It is totally implausible that Margetts could have held such an expectation, given
the fact that American Savings had the power to foreclose Margetts' interest in the Project
and deny him any recovery whatsoever.
Margetts must prove fraud and misrepresentation by clear and convincing
evidence. Despain v. Despain, 855 P.2d 254, 255 (Utah App. 1993). The trial court found
that such evidence does not exist, and that finding must be upheld.
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B.

The Evidence Supports the Trial Court's Finding that Margetts Could not
have Reasonably Relied on Alleged Statements by Snow.
One of the elements of fraud is actual justifiable reliance on the alleged

misrepresentation. Masters v. Worsley, 111 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah App. 1989) (citing Taylor
v. Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d 293, 294 (Utah 1980)). The trial court found that Margetts could
not have reasonably relied upon any misrepresentation by Snow as to the binding effect of
the Twenty Percent Agreement upon American Savings.
Although Margetts claimed that Snow tricked him into executing the Twenty
Percent Agreement, the Release and the Condominium Purchase Agreement, Margetts
admitted that he had read all of the contracts before he signed them. (Tr. 252 and 256.) He
was represented by an attorney when he executed the contracts. (Id. at 253.) Margetts
understood ihe language of the Condominium Purchase Agreement and the Twenty Percent
Agreement. (Id. at 254 and 256.) Thus, Margetts knew when he signed the contracts that
American Savings was not a party to the Twenty Percent Agreement. (R. 467-468, Bench
Decision at 5.) The trial court found that he recognized the inconsistencies between the
written meaning of the agreements and the alleged statements by Snow. (Supp. Findings
1I.B.3; Findings, f 1.13.)
Margetts never requested that Snow's alleged representations be memorialized
in writing. (R. 467-468, Bench Decision at 5; Findings, 1f 1.13.) He signed all the
documents as they were presented to him. (Tr. 176.) Thus, Margetts received exactly what
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the contracts stated he would receive. '"One who gets what he bargains for cannot be said to
be defrauded.'" State v. Fisher, 79 Utah 115, 120, 8 P.2d 589, 590 (Utah 1932).
Based on these facts, the trial court's ruling that Margetts did not justifiably
rely on the alleged misrepresentations is consistent with the evidence and must be affirmed.
C.

Margetts Offers no Basis for Overturning the Trial Court's Finding that
He Entered into the Agreements Voluntarily, Without Duress.
Margetts' Answer, Seventh Defense, alleges that American Savings "engaged

in improper conduct amounting to duress to force defendant to surrender his . . . lien against
the [Project]." (R. 30; a copy of the Answer is attached hereto as Addendum F.) Margetts
failed to marshall any evidence at trial to provide this defense. Accordingly, the trial court
found that he entered into the agreements surrendering his lien in exchange for the right to
purchase the condominium at a reduced price. (Findings, 11.8.) On appeal, Margetts
similarly fails to marshal evidence to support his claim of duress. The following is the
extent of his discussion of the issue in his brief: "[d]uress and coercion are also present"
(citation omitted). (Brief of Appellant, p. 34.) The Court should summarily affirm on the
duress claim.
D.

Margetts Either Failed to Plead or Offer Evidence to Support his Other
Theories of Improper Conduct.
The remaining theories of "improper conduct" (negligent misrepresentation,

mistake, etc.) asserted in Margetts' brief are not even pleaded in his Answer. Nor were they
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asserted at trial. Margetts gave each theory one sentence in his brief. {Id.) This Court
should give them similar treatment.
V.

BECAUSE MARGETTS WRONGFULLY RETAINED POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY AFTER REPUDIATING HIS PURCHASE AGREEMENT, HE
FORFEITED HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE AGREEMENT AND NEW WEST IS
ENTITLED TO THE FAIR RENTAL VALUE DURING THE PERIOD OF HIS
WRONGFUL OCCUPANCY.
A.

New West Was Entitled to Recover Fair Rental Value.
Margetts took possession of the condominium unit in August of 1985. In

August of 1987, New West made a final demand on Margetts to perform his obligations
under the Condominium Purchase Agreement. (Tr. 181-183.) Margetts refused and insisted
he was entitled to credits (based on the Twenty Percent Agreement) which would allow him
to get the unit for free. (R. 467-468.) The trial court found that Margetts was not entitled
to those credits; therefore his refusal to pay amounted to a repudiation or breach of the
purchase agreement. (Findings, f II.5-9; R. 517-18.) Margetts refused to vacate the unit
until after the trial, on November 30, 1989. {Id. at f 11.19.) During the four-year period of
his occupancy, he made no payments under the purchase agreement and no payments of rent.
(Id.)
The trial court did not award New West the fair rental value during the initial
two-year period Margetts occupied the unit. (R. 467-468.) The court found that Margetts
provided certain services and both parties benefited from Margetts' possession during that
period of time. (Id.) However, the trial court did award fair rental value from the date
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Margetts finally repudiated his obligation to pay for the condominium until the date he
vacated the unit. This determination is consistent with Utah law. Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d
1082, 1085 (Utah 1983). See also Marshall v. Bare, 687 P.2d 591, 594 (Idaho Ct. App.
1984) (a purchaser of land who disaffirms the purchase contract while in possession must pay
the seller fair rental value of the land); Abrams v. Financial Service Co., 13 Utah 2d 343,
374 P.2d 309, 311 (1962) (seller is entitled to reasonable rent for time a proposed buyer used
house rent-free).
It is important to note that New West did not seek other damages for breach of
contract, such as the difference between the contract price and the current market value of
the unit. Under the case law cited above, New West was entitled to opt for rental value
during the period it was denied the use of its property. To permit Margetts to continue using
the unit rent free after refusing to honor a valid purchase agreement would constitute unjust
enrichment. Knight v. Post, 748 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah App. 1988). Alternatively, New
West would be entitled to recover the rental value under principles of quantum meruit.
Regardless of the underlying theory, the above case law makes it clear that the disaffirming
buyer is liable for fair rental value during the period he wrongfully retains possession of the
property.
B.

The Termination of Margetts' Rights Under the Purchase Agreement Was
Not Unjust or Unconscionable.
Margetts argues that his forfeiture of the nonrefundable $150,000.00 credit

under the purchase agreement was unconscionable. It is important to remember that this
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credit did not represent funds actually paid to American Savings. Rather, it simply
represented a concession on the purchase price of the unit in consideration of the release of
Margetts' junior lien on the project which allowed New West and Terrace Falls to avoid the
complications of a formal foreclosure to eliminate his lien. For that reason, the
Condominium Purchase Agreement specifically provided that the credit was "nonrefundable".
The cases Margetts relies upon involve contract buyers who default after
making substantial payments toward the purchase of the property. None of the cases
Margetts cites involves a credit like the one Margetts held. Rather, in each of these cases,
the seller's damages for the buyer's default are merely offset in the amount of money the
buyer had paid to the seller under the contract before the buyer defaulted. Sojfe v. Ridd, 659
P.2d 1082 (Utah 1983) (court refuses to enforce forfeiture provision of contract, requiring
seller to return amount buyer paid under the contract, less fair rental value and other
miscellaneous damages); Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991) (seller required to
return to buyer amount buyer had paid under contract in excess of seller's actual damages);
Allen v. Kingdon, 723 P.2d 394 (Utah 1986) (same); Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d 681 (Utah
1981) (same); Johnson v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371 (Utah 1977) (same); Jacobsen v. Swan,
278 P.2d 294 (Utah 1954) (same). In these cases, the law properly provides that the buyer's
substantial equity in the property may not be summarily forfeited. These cases have no
application here, however, because Margetts made no payments to American Savings under
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the contract.- Margetts simply lost a discount on the price of a condominium because he
decided not to buy the condominium.
Simply put, the facts surrounding the $150,000 credit amount to this:
Margetts had a nonrefundable credit toward the purchase of a condominium. He decided not
to purchase the condominium. He now wants a cash refund of that nonrefundable credit.
The trial court found he was not entitled to such a refund under the terms of the
Condominium Purchase Agreement.
In reality, Margetts' credit was not forfeited, he simply repudiated it by
refusing to perform the contract. The trial court recognized that fact and saw no reason to
deduct the $150,000.00 from the rent to which New West was entitled for the period
Margetts wrongfully refused to relinquish possession of the unit. Accordingly, Margetts
suffered no unconscionable or unjust forfeiture.
C.

The Evidence of Fair Rental Value Supported the Award to New West.
New West provided expert testimony on the fair rental value of the

condominium unit. The witness was a real estate broker who had twelve years of real estate
experience. (Tr. 149.) He was the property manager for Terrace Falls Condominiums.
(Tr. 150.) He had experience managing other, similar projects. (Tr. 150, 151.) Based on
his experience, this witness testified that during the period Margetts occupied the unit, the
fair rental value was between $900.00 and $1,000.00 per month. (Tr. 158.) The trial court
-;
The court did find that Margetts had made certain improvements in the unit, the value of which was
deducted from the rent awarded to New West. (Findings, f 11.19.)
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awarded rent of $900 per month rent beginning after the date of repudiation, September 1,
1987, until Margetts vacated. (Findings ff 1.26; 11.10.) Margetts never challenged this
witness' credibility or rebutted the testimony with his own evidence. Because he failed to
put on any evidence of fair rental value of Unit 413, the trial court had no choice but to
accept the evidence proffered by New West and award $900.00 per month for rent.

VI.

THE JUDGMENT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER MUST BE UPHELD.
A.

Margetts Failed To Raise Objections In The Trial Court To the
Applicability of the Unlawful Detainer Statute or to Any Failure By New
West To Comply With its Procedural Requirements.
It is unnecessary for this Court to review the judgment for unlawful detainer.

Prior to this appeal, Margetts never raised the issue of whether New West was making an
appropriate claim under the unlawful detainer statute or whether it complied with the statute's
procedural requirements. Such objections were not raised in Margetts' Answer (R. 27-51),
his Pre-Trial Brief (R. 415-430) or at trial. They were raised for the first time on appeal.
An issue not raised to the trial court cannot be considered for the first time on appeal.
Ringwood, 786 P.2d at 1359; Ringwood v. Hernandez, 795 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1990); Broberg
v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201-202 (Utah App. 1989). Therefore, this Court should summarily
affirm the award for unlawful detainer.
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B.

Margetts is Liable for Unlawful Detainer Because He Wrongfully Retained
Possession of the Property After Repudiating the Purchase Agreement.
Utah's unlawful detainer statute states in pertinent part:
(1)
A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is
guilty of unlawful detainer:
(a)
when he continues in possession, in person
or by subtenant, of the property or any part of it, after
the expiration of the specified term or period for which it
is let to him, which specified term or period, whether
established by express or implied contract, or whether
written or parol, shall be terminated without notice at the
expiration of the specified term or period . . . or
(e)
when he continues in possession, in person or by
subtenant, after a neglect or failure to perform any condition or
covenant of the lease or agreement under which the property is held,
other than those previously mentioned, and after notice in writing
requiring in the alternative the performance of the conditions or
covenant or the surrender of the property . . . .

Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3(l)(a), (e).
Margetts continued to possess the unit after wrongfully refusing New West's
demand that he perform under the Condominium Purchase Agreement or vacate the unit.
Upon his repudiation of the contract and refusal to vacate, the implied agreement by which
he possessed the unit ended. Thereafter, Margetts' possession was an unlawful detainer
under subsections (a) and (e) of the statute.
C.

New West Complied With the Unlawful Detainer Statute.
New West's Complaint alleged that it served Margetts with a Notice to Quit by

certified mail as required by § 78-36-6. (R. 7, f 20.) In his Answer, Margetts admitted to
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receiving the Notice to Quit. (R. 27-51, 1 11.) Margetts did not in his Answer or at trial
assert that the Notice to Quit was improperly mailed. Accordingly, New West did not offer
evidence to that effect. Based on the authority cited above, Margetts cannot raise this issue
for the first time on appeal.
Margetts asserts that the award for unlawful detainer should be overturned
because his wife was not served with the Notice to Quit. Again, this defense was not raised
in this Answer, his Pre-trial brief or at trial. The unlawful detainer statute does not require
that all occupants be personally handed a copy of the Notice to Quit. New West's Notice to
Quit was properly addressed to "the occupants of the premises located at Unit 413." (R. 22,
Ex. D.)
Margetts failed to comply with the Notice to Quit. The trial court correctly
determined that he was liable for unlawful detainer. That judgment should be affirmed.

VII.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED ATTORNEYS' FEES TO NEW
WEST.
A.

At Trial Both Parties Agreed that the Prevailing Party Would be Entitled
to Attorneys' Fees and Margetts Did Not Object to the Amount of New
West's Fees.
This Court need not review the award of attorneys' fees to New West.

Margetts never questioned whether an award of attorneys' fees was proper. Indeed, in the
following exchange during the trial, Margetts' counsel requested a special hearing for the
prevailing party to present attorneys' fees:
-29s \wcb\18812

MR. FAIRCLOUGH: With the Court's permission, and I have
no objection that we wait until you make your decision. The prevailing
party would then have an opportunity to present attorney's fees and
discuss the matter at a separate hearing. I have no objection to that.
THE COURT: Is that agreeable?
MR. BATTLE: Yes, that is agreeable.
THE COURT: That's fine.
(Tr. 279.)
After the trial concluded, New West submitted an Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees
and Costs. The Affidavit requested attorneys' fees of $20,515. Margetts filed an Objection
contesting certain cost items, but he did not challenge the amount of New West's attorneys'
fees. (R. 485-486.) Thereafter, the court awarded New West attorneys' fees in the amount
requested. (R. 519-522.) As noted above, an objection or issue not raised to the trial court
cannot be considered for the first time on appeal. Ringwood, 786 P.2d 1359; Broberg, 782
P.2d at 201-202. The Court should summarily affirm the award of attorneys' fees.
B.

The Condominium Purchase Agreement Provides for an Award of
Attorneys9 Fees.
Margetts admits that the Condominium Purchase Agreement provides for

attorneys' fees to the prevailing party if a dispute arises under the agreement. Appellant's
Brief at 45. He argues, however, that this case does not involve a dispute under the
Condominium Purchase Agreement.
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Obviously, New West's lawsuit resulted directly from Margetts' refusal to
perform the Condominium Purchase Agreement. The trial court ruled that Margetts
breached the Condominium Purchase Agreement. (Findings, if II.8.) The fact that New
West sought to recover fair rental value did not mean that it abandoned its rights under the
Condominium Purchase Agreement, as Margetts now argues. To the contrary, his refusal to
perform that Agreement, coupled with his refusal to vacate was the basis for the award to
New West. It was also the basis for the award of attorneys' fees.
Moreover, Margetts was attempting to enforce his interpretation of the
Condominium Purchase Agreement, modified by the Twenty Percent Agreement. He
contended that those agreements, read together, required New West to deliver him the unit
free of charge. New West is entitled to attorneys' fees for defeating that claim under the
Condominium Purchase Agreement.
When a contract's terms provide for an award of attorneys' fees, the fees are
"to be awarded as a matter of legal right." Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah
App. 1989). Accordingly, this Court must affirm the award of attorneys' fees to New West.

VIII. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
TO NEW WEST.
The trial court determined that the rental value of the unit was susceptible of
mathematical computation. The trial court observed,
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as to the prejudgment interest, we are talking about rentals. And once
a rental value is determined . . . it is susceptible of mathematical
computation. And I think that's quite different from the personal injury
case where pain and suffering is not ascertainable. Once having found
what the reasonable rental value is, then it is a mathematical
computation.
(Bench Decision, dated September 28, 1992, R. 930.) The trial court's decision to award
prejudgment interest to New West is not inconsistent with this Court's decisions in Shoreline
Development, Inc. v. Utah County, 835 P.2d 207 (Utah App. 1992) and Price-Orem v.
Rawlins, Brown & Gunnell, 784 P.2d 475 (Utah App. 1989). Those cases followed the
guidelines set by the Utah Supreme Court in Bjork v. April Industries Inc., 560 P.2d 315,
317 (Utah 1977) cert. den. 431 U.S. 930 (1977): "Where the damage is complete and the
amount of loss fixed as of a particular time, and that loss can be measured by facts and
figures, interest should be allowed from that time and not from the date of the judgment."
Under the Supreme Court's test, New West is entitled to prejudgment interest
because the rental value is a fixed amount ($900 per month) and can be assessed from a fixed
date (September 1, 1987, the date Margetts repudiated the contract and refused to vacate). It
is a simple mathematical computation of damages for breach of the Condominium Purchase
Agreement. The Shoreline and Price-Orem cases are distinguishable because one involved an
equitable claim for unjust enrichment and the other involved a claim for lost profits. In
neither case could damages be determined with mathematical precision and this Court
properly disallowed prejudgment interest. Damages in the present case, however, were
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calculated with absolute mathematical precision as indicated in the trial court's Findings at
f 11.19. Accordingly, that award of prejudgment interest must be upheld.
CONCLUSION
New West respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the trial
court in all respects. Furthermore, New West requests an award of costs and attorneys' fees
on appeal, pursuant to the contract provisions referred to in Section VII, above.
DATED this 22nd day of October, 1993.

W. Cullen Battle
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of October, 1993, I caused to be handdelivered two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to:
Ralph J. Marsh
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH
800 Mclntyre Building
68 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

NEW WEST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION, successorin-interest to American Savings
and Loan Association,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN L. MARGETTS,

SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW
Civil No. 890901645CN
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendant.
On February 20, 1992, the Utah Court of Appeals issued
a Memorandum Decision reversing the final judgment entered by
this Court on April 23, 1990. The Court of Appeals remanded the
case, requesting this Court to enter additional findings of fact
and conclusions of law on the issues of agency and fraud.

The

Court of Appeals also requested this Court to clarify why it
awarded New West Federal Savings and Loan Association ("New
West") remedies that included a combination of forfeiture and
rent.

Pursuant to these instructions, the Court enters the

following Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
These findings and conclusions are entered in addition to and not
in replacement of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
entered April 23, 1990.
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I.
A.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Agency
This Court finds that Gerald Snow, in his dealings with

defendant Margetts regarding Terrace Falls, never acted as an
agent or attorney for American Savings and Loan Association
("American Savings"), and that Mr, Snow was never vested with
actual or apparent authority to enter into agreements with
defendant Margetts in behalf of American Savings.

In support of

these findings, the Court enters the following subsidiary
findings:
1.

In 1981, Mr. Snow began serving as counsel for

Terrace Falls Condominiums Partnership ("Terrace Falls"), which
owned the Terrace Falls Condominiums project (the "Project").
(Tr. 25.)
2.

In December, 1981, Mr. Snow represented Terrace

Falls in obtaining a construction loan for the Project from
American Savings and Loan Association ("American Savings"), the
predecessor to New West.
3.

(Tr. 26-31.)

In December of 1981, as part of his efforts to help

Terrace Falls obtain the construction loan, Mr. Snow met and
negotiated with defendant Margetts and his attorney, Ralph Marsh,
concerning the subordination of a lien Margetts held against the
Project. On that occasion, Mr. Snow advised both defendant
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Margetts and Mr. Marsh that he was representing Terrace Falls.
(Tr. 31-32; 109-111.)
4.

Mr. Snow, as attorney for Terrace Falls, drafted

the original condominium purchase agreement between defendant
Margetts and Terrace Falls in 1981.
5.

(Tr. 33-34.)

When Terrace Falls defaulted on the construction

loan in 1984, Mr. Snow, in his capacity as attorney for Terrace
Falls, began negotiating a loan workout with American Savings.
American Savings retained Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell locally,
and Roulac Garn of the law firm of Barlow, Welch, Terrant &
Miller in California, to represent it as counsel in these
negotiations.
6.

(Tr. 39-40; 59; 283.)
In September of 1984, American Savings agreed to

accept a deed in lieu of foreclosure from Terrace Falls provided
that Terrace Falls could deliver free and clear title to the
Project.

To clear title, Mr. Snow, in his capacity as counsel

for Terrace Falls, thereafter began negotiating to obtain
releases from Terrace Falls1 creditors who held liens on the
Project.

Defendant Margetts was one of the lien creditors

contacted by Mr. Snow.
7.

(Tr. 39; 53; 56-59.)

Mr. Snow first contacted Margetts regarding the

1984 negotiations through a letter to Mr. Marsh dated
September 7, 1984.

(Tr. 56; Ex. 5.)

That letter explained that
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Terrace Palls was attempting to negotiate a deed in lieu of
foreclosure with American Savings and that such an arrangement
would require "an acceptable settlement with all the junior
lienholders." (Ld.)
8.

The September 7, 1984 letter identified Kirton,

McConkie and Bushnell as local counsel for American Savings.
(Ld.)

Nothing in the letter suggests that Mr. Snow was

representing American Savings or anyone other than Terrace Falls,
(id.)
9.

The September 7, 1984 letter requested defendant

Margetts to attend a meeting with American Savings at the offices
of Kirton, McConkie and Bushnell, its local counsel, the
following week.

(id.) Defendant Margetts and his attorney, Mr.

Marsh, both attended the meeting.

(Tr. 60; 244; 264.)

Mr. Perry

from Kirton, McConkie and Bushnell represented American Savings,
and Mr. Snow attended on behalf of Terrace Falls, (id.)

A Mr.

Lee Stephens from American Savings also attended the meeting,
(id.)

Defendant Margetts mistakenly believed that Mr. Stephens

was an attorney.
10.

(Tr. 244.)

During the ensuing negotiations, which culminated

in November, 1984, Mr. Snow never told defendant Margetts or Mr.
Marsh that he was representing American Savings.
109-111.)

(Tr. 79-80;

Defendant Margetts and Mr. Marsh both admit this fact.
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(Tr. 248; 266.)

Defendant Margetts also admits that he never

inquired as to whom Mr. Snov vas representing.
11.

(Id.)

During this entire periodf defendant Margetts'

only contact vith American Savings vas the initial September
meeting at Kirtonf McConkie and Bushnell.

(Tr. 244-47.)

No one

at that meeting, including Mr. Perry and Mr. Stephens, told
Margetts that Mr. Snov vas representing American Savings.

(Tr.

248.)
12.

Throughout the fall of 1984, Mr. Snov negotiated

settlements and releases vith Terrace Falls1 lien creditors.
(Tr. 53.)

Mr. Snov also drafted the settlement agreements and

obtained signatures on the settlement documents from Terrace
Falls' lien creditors.

(id.) Throughout these negotiations, Mr.

Snov represented only Terrace Falls.

(Tr. 55.)

The Court finds

that Snov, in engaging in these activities, vas serving the
interests of Terrace Falls, vhich directly benefited from the
transaction by avoiding the adverse consequences of a
foreclosure.

Mr. Snov never intended to represent American

Savings, nor did he believe that he vas representing American
Savings in these negotiations.
13.

(Tr. 80.)

During his negotiations vith defendant Margetts,

Mr. Snov assumed that defendant Margetts knev that he continued
to represent Terrace Falls, not American Savings.
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(Tr. 110.)

14.

Throughout the time he was negotiating lien

creditor settlements for Terrace Falls, Mr. Snow sent to American
Savings or its attorneys, for their review and approval, drafts
of all settlement documents that he believed would create a legal
obligation on the part of American Savings.
15.

(Tr. 82.)

Mr. Snow never presented to American Savings or

its attorneys for final review and approval, the Agreement, dated
November 14, 1984, executed by defendant Margetts and Terrace
Falls (the "Twenty Percent Agreement").

Mr. Snow did not intend

that agreement to create a legal duty on the part of American
Savings.

(Tr. 71; 140.)
16.

Neither American Savings nor its attorneys saw the

Twenty Percent Agreement before it was executed by defendant
Margetts and Terrace Falls.
17.

(Tr. 71; 286.)

American Savings never gave Mr. Snow permission to

enter into any agreements on behalf of American Savings.

(Tr.

285-286).
18.

Because Terrace Falls lacked funds to pay Mr.

Snow's attorney's fees for his work on behalf of Terrace Falls to
complete the construction loan workout, American Savings agreed
to pay Mr. Snow's attorney's fees as it paid other Terrace Falls
creditors.

(Tr. 50 and 51.) Mr. Margetts was not aware that

American Savings had agreed to pay Mr. Snow's attorney's fees at
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the time he entered into the Condominium Purchase Agreementf the
Settlement Agreement and the Twenty Percent Agreement.
19.

American Savings never ratified the Twenty Percent

Agreement, nor did American Savings or New West agree to accept
Terrace Falls' liabilities under the Twenty Percent Agreement.
B.

Fraud
This Court finds that defendant Margetts failed to

establish by clear and convincing evidence that American Savings,
its agents or its attorneys made a material misrepresentation in
connection with the negotiation and execution of the Condominium
Purchase Agreement, the Settlement Agreement, the Twenty Percent
Agreement or any other documents by which defendant Margetts
released his lien on the Project and agreed to purchase a
condominium from American Savings after the Project was
completed.

In support of this finding, and in addition to the

subsidiary findings regarding agency set forth above, the Court
enters the following subsidiary findings:
1.

Mr. Snow never stated to defendant Margetts or his

attorney that Mr. Snow represented American Savings.

(Tr. 79 and

80.)
2.

The Court finds that Mr. Snow did not state to

defendant Margetts that American Savings would become Terrace
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Falls or would otherwise succeed to Terrace Falls' legal duties
under the Twenty Percent Agreement.
3.

(Tr. 136 and 137.)

Other than defendant Margetts' testimony, which

the Court chose not to accept, the Court heard no evidence that
Mr. Snow represented that the Twenty Percent Agreement would be
binding upon American Savings. The remaining evidence, including
Margetts' long history of dealings with Terrace Falls, and the
written document which on its face was inconsistent with the
alleged misrepresentations, leads the Court to conclude that
Margetts was not mislead as to the meaning or effect of the
Twenty Percent Agreement.
4.

American Savings' representatives were not

involved in the negotiation or execution of the Twenty Percent
Agreement, and never represented to defendant Margetts that
American Savings would be bound by the Twenty Percent Agreement.
(Tr. 71 and 140.)
5.

Based upon the subsidiary findings regarding

agency, above, and the Court's earlier findings of April 23,
1990, and particularly the written document which on its face was
an agreement between Margetts and Terrace Falls only, this Court
finds that it would have been unreasonable for defendant Margetts
to have relied upon any representation by Mr. Snow as to the
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binding effect of the Twenty Percent Agreement upon American
Savings.
6.

Based on the foregoingf the Court further finds

that there is not clear and convincing evidence to show that Mr.
Snow misrepresented the binding effect of the Twenty Percent
Agreement on American Savings, or that defendant Margetts
reasonably relied upon any such misrepresentations.
II.
A.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Agency
1.

The evidence established that Mr. Snow did not act

on behalf of American Savings and that American Savings did not
control Mr. Snow in his negotiations with defendant Margetts.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that a principal-agent
relationship did not exist between Mr. Snow and American Savings.
2.

The acts of an agent are not binding on the

principal unless the agent is acting pursuant to either actual or
apparent authority, or the principal ratifies the acts of the
agent.

Municipal Building Auth. v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273, 279

(Utah 1985).

The Court concludes that Mr. Snow did not have

actual authority to bind American Savings in his negotiations
with Margetts.
3.

The apparent authority of an agent can be inferred

only from the conduct of the principal.

City Elec. v. Dean Evans
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Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1983); Walker Bank &
Trust Co. v. Jones, 672 P.2d 73, 75 (Utah 1983).

The Court

concludes that American Savings and its representatives did not
make statements or engage in conduct from which defendant
Margetts could reasonably infer that Mr. Snow had authority to
bind American Savings.
4.

A person dealing exclusively with an agent has a

duty to ascertain the agent's authority despite any
representations of the agent.

City Elec.. 672 P.2d at 90. The

Court concludes that defendant Margetts failed to satisfy that
duty regarding his assertion that Mr. Snow was representing
American Savings in negotiating the Twenty Percent Agreement.
5.

Mr. Snow did not have actual or apparent authority

to bind American Savings to the Twenty Percent Agreement, and
American Savings did not ratify actions or statements by Mr. Snow
regarding that agreement.

Commercial Fixtures & Furnishings,

Inc. v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1977) (a party does not
assume another party's contractual liabilities merely because it
benefits from the agreement); County of Clark v. Bonanza No. 1,
615 P.2d 939, 943 (Nev. 1980).
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B.

Fraud
1.

In order to prove fraud, a person must show, by

clear and convincing evidence, a material misrepresentation of
fact made knowingly or recklessly with the intent to induce
reliance, actual and justifiable reliance on the
misrepresentation, and damages resulting from the reliance.
Taylor v. Gasor, Inc.. 607 P.2d 293, 294 and 95 (Utah 1980).
2.

Defendant Margetts failed to establish, by clear

and convincing evidence that American Savings, its agents or its
attorneys fraudulently induced him to enter into the Settlement
Agreement, the Condominium Purchase Agreement or the Twenty
Percent Agreement.
C.

Remedies
1.

Defendant Margetts repudiated the Condominium

Purchase Agreement in August of 1987 when he refused New West's
final demand to close on Unit 413.

By repudiating the

Condominium Purchase Agreement, defendant Margetts forfeited his
right under the Condominium Purchase Agreement to receive a
non-refundable $150,000 credit towards the purchase of a Terrace
Falls Condominium.
2.

A seller of real estate is entitled to receive

reasonable rent from a disaffirming buyer for the period of time
the buyer possessed the real estate rent-free.

Abrams v.
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Financial Serv. Co., 13 Utah 2d 343, 374 P.2d 309, 311 (1962);
Marshall v. Bare. 687 P.2d 591, 594 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984).
3.

Because the fair rental value of Unit 413 was

§900.00 per month during the period of defendant Margetts1
occupancy. New West is entitled to receive $900.00 per month rent
from the date defendant Margetts repudiated the Condominium
Purchase Agreement to the date defendant Margetts vacated Unit
413.
4.

Defendant Margetts is entitled to an offset

against rent for the amount of his improvements to Unit 413, as
set forth in the Court's earlier findings, dated April 23, 1990.
However, Margetts is not entitled to further offset regarding the
$150,000 credit because that amount was not paid to or received
by American Savings, but was merely reflected as a credit against
the purchase price under the Condominium Purchase Agreement.
DATED this

lb -tlay of

0 efofcls

1992.

BY THE COURT:

Kennfeth Rigtfup^
District Court Judge
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Ralph J. Marsh
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 30th day of September,
1992, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be handdelivered to:
Ralph J. Marsh
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH
800 Mclntyre Building
68 South Main Street
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84101
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
NEW WEST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION, successor-ininterest to AMERICAN SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION, a California
corporation,
Plainti ff,

)
)
)
)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

V•

Civil No. 890901645CN

JOHN L. MARGETTS,

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendant.

)

The court hereby enters the following Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law in connection with the trial that was held
on November 14, 15 and 16, 1989.
I.
1.

FINDINGS OF FACT

On November 14, 1984, Plaintiff's predecessor,

American Savings and Loan Association ("American Savings"), and
defendant John L. Margetts ("Margetts") entered into a Condominium Purchase Agreement (the "Agreement") (Exhibit 7) whereby
Margetts agreed to purchase from American Savings Unit 413 of the
Terrace Falls Condominium Project (the "Project").
2.

The purchase price for Unit 413 under the Purchase

Agreement was $134,283, which reflected a non-refundable $150,000
credit that was granted to Margetts against the original list
price of Unit 413.

00512

3.

On November 14, 1984, Margetts and American Savings

also entered into a Settlement Agreement (the "Settlement Agreement") (Exhibit 6) in which Margetts, in consideration of the
Purchase Agreement and $150,000 credit granted toward his purchase of Unit 413, gave up all other claims he may have had
against American Savings, or liens he may have had against the
Project.
4.

Prior to American Savings' acquisition of the

Project, it held a first lien against the Project, and Margetts
held a lien that was subordinate to American Savings' lien.
5.

In furtherance of the Settlement Agreement,

Margetts on November 14, 1984, executed a General Release
(Exhibit 8) and a Request for Reconveyance (Exhibit 9) pursuant
to which he released all claims against American Savings or the
Project except his rights under the Purchase Agreement.
6.

The Purchase Agreement is unambiguous and it repre-

sents the entire agreement between Margetts and American Savings
concerning the purchase of Unit 413.
7.

The Settlement Agreement is unambiguous and it rep-

resents the entire agreement between Margetts, American Savings,
Terrace Falls Condominiums, a Utah partnership ("Terrace Falls")
and its principals concerning the release of Margetts' lien
claims against the Project.
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8.

Margetts entered into the Settlement Agreement and

the Purchase Agreement voluntarily, without duress.
9.

The Agreement, dated November 14, 1984 between

Margetts and Terrace Falls, which has been referred to by the
parties as the "20% Agreement" (Exhibit 10), was executed by
Margetts and Terrace Falls only.
10.

American Savings did not agree to perform any

obligations under the 20% Agreement.
11.

American Savings did not otherwise agree to assume

any obligations of Terrace Falls or its principals to Margetts.
12.

No fraud was committed by American Savings, or its

agents or attorneys, in connection with the negotiation and execution of the Purchase Agreement, the Settlement Agreement, the
20% Agreement or the other documents referred to above.
13.

Even if Gerald Snow, who was Terrace Falls1 attor-

ney, had made material misrepresentations of fact to Margetts in
connection with the execution of those documents, any reliance by
Margetts upon those misrepresentations would have been unreasonable because:
(a) Margetts recognized that the 20% Agreement
was inconsistent with Snow's alleged representations;
(b) Margetts was represented by an attorney in
the transaction, but he did not consult with that attorney
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regarding the apparent inconsistency between the agreement
and the alleged representations;
(c)

Margetts did not request that the alleged

representations be memorialized in writing; and
(d)

Margetts never inquired about Mr. Snow's

authority to bind American Savings.
14.

Mr. Snow did not have actual or apparent authority

to enter into agreements in behalf of American Savings, or to
modify existing agreements.
15.

Margetts took occupancy of Unit 413 in August

1985, before closing or paying any of the purchase price.
16.

When Margetts moved into Unit 413, no agreement

existed between Margetts and American Savings concerning the
terms of his occupancy of the Unit.

However, both parties

derived benefit from Margetts' occupancy of the Unit.
17.

Unit 413 was not completely finished when Margetts

took possession.

Margetts personally expended $9,234 to substan-

tially complete the Unit.
18.

After Margetts took possession of Unit 413, Ameri-

can Savings discontinued using security personnel for the
Project.
19.

American Savings encouraged Margetts to find buy-

ers for other units in the Project and to promote the Project.
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20.

No agreement existed between American Savings and

Margetts concerning compensation of Margetts for security services or for finding buyers for the Project.
21.

By a letter dated March llf 1986, American Savings

notified Margetts that it intended to close the sale of Unit 413
on March 19, 1986.
22.

(Exhibit 26).

In late August, 1987 American Savings made final

demand on Margetts to consummate the purchase of Unit 413 in
accordance with the Purchase Agreement for the purchase price of
$134,283.
23.

On September 2, 1987, Margetts rejected American

Savings' request for closing and payment of the purchase price.
24.

Thereafter, Margetts continued to refuse to pay

the purchase price or to return the Unit to American Savings.
25.

By no later than March 25, 1989, American Savings

had served Margetts with a 5-day Notice to Quit pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. S78-36-3.
26.

(Exhibit 13).

The fair rental value of Unit 413 during the

period of Margetts' occupancy is $900 per month.
II.
1.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

By accepting a deed-in lieu of foreclosure to the

Project, American Savings did not assume any contract obligations
of Terrace Falls to Margetts.
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2.

The Purchase Agreement and the Settlement Agreement

are clear and unambiguous and they represent entire agreements
between the parties on the subjects they purport to cover.
3.

The 20% Agreement is an agreement between Terrace

Falls and Margetts only.

It is not performable by American

Savings.
4.

Extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to alter or

amend the terms of the Purchase Agreement or the Settlement
Agreement.
5.

The Purchase Agreement unconditionally required

Margetts to pay American Savings $134,283 for the purchase of
Unit 413 within 15 days after receiving a request to close by
American Savings.
6.

American Savings substantially performed its obli-

gations under the Purchase Agreement and Margetts was not for any
reasons excused from performing his obligation to purchase the
Unit for $134,283.
7.

American Savings had made a final demand upon

Margetts to complete the purchase, and American Savings was entitled to receive the $134,283 purchase price, by no later than
September 1, 1987.
8.

By retaining possession of Unit 413 and refusing to

honor American Savings' demands to complete the purchase and pay
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the purchase price, Margetts was in breach of the Purchase Agreement from September 1, 1987.
9.

Margetts1 breach of the Purchase Agreement and

refusal to pay the purchase price constitute a repudiation of the
Purchase Agreement.
10.

As a consequence of such breach and repudiation,

New West Federal Savings and Loan Association ("New West"), as
successor to American Savings, is entitled to be restored to possession of Unit 413 and to recover from Margetts the fair rental
value of the Unit from the time of breach until New West is
restored to possession.
11.

Margetts has no further right, title or interest

in the Unit.
12.

In addition, New West is entitled to recover tre-

ble the fair rental value of the Unit from April 1, 1989, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S78-36-10.
13.

New West is entitled to recover interest at the

legal rate on rent due from September 1, 1987 to March 31, 1989.
However, American Savings is not entitled to interest on the
taxes and homeowners dues, or on the rent after it is trebled.
14.

Margetts is entitled to offset the foregoing

amounts with the $9,234 he expended to substantially complete the
Unit.
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15.

New West is entitled to recover reasonable attor-

neys fees incurred in connection with this action.
16.

New West is entitled to recover costs taxable

under Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and to
recover post-judgment interest as provided by law.
17.

The attorneys fees and taxable costs submitted by

New West are reasonable in the amounts which are reflected below.
18.

Because both parties mutually benefitted from

Margetts1 occupancy of the Unit from August 1985 until September
1, 1987, when Margetts repudiated the Purchase Agreement, New
West is not entitled to rent for that period.

However, Margetts

is entitled to no further compensation for security services or
for finding buyers for the Project.
19.

Pursuant to the foregoing, New West is entitled to

be possession of Unit 413 from December 1, 1989, and to recover
judgment against Margetts in the following amounts:
A.

B.

C.

The fair rental value of the
Unit from September 1, 1987 through
March 31, 1989 at $900 per month
Prejudgment interest at 10% through
November 30, 1989 on rent due
from September 1, 1987 through
March 31, 1989
Treble hold-over rent from
April 1, 1989 through November 30,
1989 at $2,700 per month

$17,100

2,565

21,600

-8-
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D.

Less the offset for work performed
by Margetts at his own expense to
complete the Unit
SUBTOTAL

E.

Taxable Costs

F.

Attorney's Fees

$32,031
105
20,515

.
DATED this

($ 9,234)

TOTAL

$52f651

23~"~day of April, 1990.
BY THE (ZOURT:

Kenneth Rigtrup//
ZF
Distrtct Court Judge
Approved As To Form:

Arthur H. Nifelsen
Attorney for Defendant

o

.,-

W. Cullen Battle
Attorney for Plaintiff

-9-
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September 1, 1984

Ralph J. Marsh
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH
68 South Main Street, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101^
Re:

Terrace Falls Condominiums

Dear Ralph:
As I mentioned to you on the telephone last week, after
many reviews, discussions, onsite inspections, etc., over the
past several months, American Savings & Loan has decided to take
over the Terrace Falls project, either by a foreclosure or a
deed in lieu. Of course, American wonft accept a deed in lieu
without arriving at some kind of an acceptable settlement with
all of the junior lienholders.
In accordance with its expressed intent to take over the
project but to try to work out terms of a settlement with the junior
lienholders (so many cents on the dollar of invested principal),
Lee Stephens of American Savings is making a special trip to Salt
Lake City next Wednesday. He has asked me to communicate with
all of the junior lienholders to invite them to a one-on-one
meeting with him next Wednesday between the hours of 10:00 a.m.
and 5:00 p.m. at the offices of Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell,
American's local counsel. You are certainly welcome to come with
Jack if you and he can work out a time. As you will appreciate,
if American isn't able to work out settlements which in the aggregate
are within its budgeted settlement amount, it will simply take the
longer but less expensive route of foreclosure.

Ralph J, Marsh
September 7, 1984
Page 2

Wells Stevens, Hal Beecher and Ron Stacey have invested
the last several years of their lives in the Terrace Falls
Project, and all have acted in good faith in the attempt to make
this project a success. No one is more deeply disappointed in
this outcome than they are, and they are anxious to see the other
creditors in the project get some money back rather than nothing.
The lender is willing to work with the other creditors partly as
a gesture of good faith because it feels that Wells and the others
have treated it honestly and fairly, not inflated costs, not
skimmed off profits somewhere, and not otherwise acted in an
uncooperative or hostile manner. Its representatives have told
us this. But its good faith has what I suppose you would consider
rather modest dollar and time limits attached.
Please let me know as soon as possible if you and your
client can attend a meeting next Wednesday and what time would
be best. The meeting shouldn*t last more than 45 minutes to an
hour.
Very truly yours,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

emerald T. Snow
GTS/lpk
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CONDOMINIUM PURCHASE AGREEMENT

REAL tj,^,
DEPARUMI

THIS AGREEMENT .is.made and entered into this . / day
of November, 1984, .by and between AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN'
ASSOCIATION, a Utah corporation ("Seller"), and JOHN L. MARGETTS,
an individual ("Buyer").
RECITALS:
A. Seller is the owner of the Terrace Falls Condominiums
Project located between 3rd and 4th Avenues west of "A" Street in
Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Project").
B. Buyer desires to acquire from Seller and Seller is
willing to sell to Buyer a condominium unit in the Project on the
terms and conditions herein set forth.
C. This Agreement is entered into pursuant to the terms
of that certain Settlement Agreement between the parties et al.,
dated OcteSeg^
''. 1984.
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows:
1. The Unit. Seller does hereby agree to convey to
Buyer and Buyer does hereby agree to purchase from Seller Unit
No. 413 in the Project (the "Unit"), as the same is shown and
described in the Declaration of Condominium and Survey Map'of the
Project to be recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder's
Office, a copy of which is attached hereto. The foregoing
description shall be construed to describe the Unit, together with
the appurtenant undivided interest in the common areas and
facilities of the Project (including one (1) parking space and one
(1) storage locker), and also to incorporate all the rights
incident to and limitations on ownership of a condominium unit in
the Proj3ct*-*s set forth in said Declaration of Condominium. The
choice of the foregoing Unit by Buyer shall constitute a final and
irrevocable selection of a condominium unit in the Project as
specified in Paragraph 2 of said Settlement Agreement.
2. Title. Seller shall convey good and marketable title
to the Unit to Buyer, subject only to the Standard Exceptions and
Special Exceptions Nos. 2, 3 and 4 set forth in that certain title
insurance commitment issued by Safeco Title Insurance Company
through Utah Title and Abstract Company, dated October 11, 1984, a
copy of which is attached hereto, as well as to the lien for
current year taxes' not- yet due and the Declaration of Condominium
and Survey Map of the Project yet to be filed.

3. Purchase Price. The purchase price of the Unit is
Two Hundred Ninety-Three Thousand Seventy-Five Dollars
($293,075.00), less three percent (3.0%) thereof for the absence
of a sales commission, for a net price of Two Hundred Eighty-Four
Thousand Two Hundred Eighty-Three Dollars (-$284,283.00). In
accordance with the Settlement Agreement mentioned in Recital C
above> -Buyer is hereby granted a nonrefundable cr^dif-in the
amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00) towards
the purchase price. The balance of the purchase price in the
amount of One Hundred Thirty-Four Thousand Two Hundred
Eighty-Three Dollars ($134,283.00) shall be due in full at the
closing as set forth hereinafter.
4.—Condition of UFI4-<H—Buy or hac inspected the^JJait,
whieh has been finished to the shell atage with walla aheetrockeo
and tapodj and io willing to aeeept the construction o£ the Un^t
to the extent performed te date*
*
5. Finish Allowance, The amount ofLt^y^inislT allowance
with respect to the Unit which is to be spent^lnc/accordance with
Buyer's specifications is Sixteen Thousand Eight Hundred
Thirty-Nine Dollars ($16,839.00). The finish allowance has been
allotted based on a standard finish package. Buyer may require
Seller to make reasonable modifications and upgrades to the
standard finish package, but all such modifications and upgrades
shall be performed entirely at Buyer's expense to the extent the
aggregate finish allowance is exceeded.
6. Possession. Possession of the Unit shall pass to
Buyer as of the closing date. Seller shall have substantially
completed the Unit to Buyer*s finish specifications prior to the
closing, provided that Seller shall have a reasonable time after
the receipt of such specifications or any final change thereto (no
less than sixty (60) days) in which to complete the Unit. Buyer
shall provide Seller with Buyer's finish specifications as soon as
possible, but not later than* March 31, 1985, so that closing can
take place not later than June 30, 1985. In the event Buyer fails
to provide Seller with finish specifications by such time, Seller
shall have t&£ right to proceed to finish the Unit in accordance
with the standard finish options then being offered to purchasers
of units in the Project.
7. Closing. The closing of the purchase and sale of the
Unit shall take place at the offices of Utah Title and Abstract
Company, 629 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, at a mutally
agreeable time, which shall be within fifteen (15) days after
written notice from Seller to Buyer that the Unit is ready for
occupancy. Readiness for occupancy shall mean that a certificate
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of occupancy for t*e Unit has/been issued by rhe Salt Lake City ^|
Building Inspection Division/ At the closing, Seller shall
deliver to Buyer a Warranty Deed to the Unit and Buyer shall
deliver to Seller a cashier's check for the balance of the
purchase price, plus any additional amount due for finish upgrade
or modifications. Property taxes, insurance and closing fees shall
be'prorated' izrthe usual'fashion as of-the date of-closing.. Also
Seller shall furnish to Buyer at Seller's expense'a title
insurance policy from a reputable title insurance company insuring
title to the Unit in Buyer in the amount of the purchase price
Title to the Unit shall be in the following name(s):
John I. Margetts and Irma W. JIargptts, Joint Tenants
i a/fas'

kf**+i

, ^;

A++/p*j****A*& 0^0m^u^*^y TP G'tJ^*

8. Default. If thcTpart&es fail to close'as set forth""'
herein through the fault of Buyer/ Buyer shall forfeit all rights
hereunder and shall have no claim against Seller, whether for
payment of any portion of the credit granted to Buyer against the
purchase price or for any other thing or amount. If there is a
delay in closing through the fault of Seller, Buyer shall be
entitled at his option to enforce this Agreement as written or to
select another available condominium unit of an equal or greater
value in place of the Unit, in which case Buyer shall receive a
credit against the purchase price of such other unit in the same
amount as the credit provided herein.
9. Assignment. This Agreenutrii; sha ,11 line 11: ee Jy
assignable by either party hereto.
10. Broker's Fees. Both parties represent and warrant
that no real estate broker has been involved in this transaction
and each party agrees to indemnify the other against any claims
for real estate commissions or finders fees or the like as a
result of the acts or omissions of such party.
11. Survival. The parties understand and agree that all
representations and warranties made herein are true and effective
both when made and as of the closing, and that all such
representations and warranties shall survive the closing.
12
Binding Effect. This Agreement shall inure to the
benefit of and be binding upon the parties and their respective
legal representatives, heirs, successors and assigns.
13. Counterpart Originals. For the convenience of the
parties, this Agreement shall be executed in two (2) cour. erpart
originals, which taken together shall constitute a single
agreement.
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14. Notice. Any notice provided for by this Agreement
shall be in writing and shall be deemed to have been given on the
date on which such notice is either hand delivered to the party to
whom such notice is directed or is deposited in the United States
mail as a certified or registered letter, postage prepaid, return
receipt requested, pr-operly addressed to such party at the address
specified below:
If to Seller, at:
American Savings & Loan Association
300 North Harrison, 5th Floor
Stockton, California 95203
Attn: Real Estate Dept.
If to Buyer, at:
John L. Margetts
2182 Berkeley Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

84109

Any such address may be changed by giving notice thereof in
accordance with the above procedure.
15. Headings. The headings of the Paragraphs herein
have been inserted for ease of reference only and shall not
control or affect the meaning or- interpretation of any of the
terms and provisions hereof.
16. Governing Law. This Agreement is entered into under
and shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah.
17. Further Action. The parties hereby agree to execute
and deliver such additional documents and to take such further
action as may become necessary or desirable to fully carry out the
provisions and intent of this Agreement.
18. Prior Agreements. This Agreement supersedes any
prior understandings or agreements between the parties, whether
written or verbal, respecting the within subject matter, including
without limitation the aforesaid Settlement Agreement, and
contains the entire undersanding of the parties with respect
thereto.
19. Force Majeure. Seller shall not be deemed to be in
breach hereof because of any nonperformance due to war, riot or
other civil disturbance, flood, fire, natural disaster, labor
strike, or other circumstance beyond the reasonable control of
Seller.

2

"". E n f ° 5 c e r n e n t • l n t h « event „„ » dispute between fh.
parties arising under this Agreement, the party prevailing i? *,U c
dispute shall be entitled to recover such fart?'! S i t J fLm \t hS *
other party, including without limitation 1 5 5 ? 0
Ld
*
reasonable attorney's fees.
costs ana
AN W I T N E S S W H E R E O F , the parties have executed
Agreement on the date hereinabove first written.

s

SELLER:
AMERICAN SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION

*S

BUXEjR:

! ^ ^ —

9009s
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AGREEMENT
IN CONSIDERATION OF and as further inducement to the
execution and delivery by John L. Margetts ("Margetts") of a
Condominium Purchase Agreement, Request for Reconveyance and
General Release, as set forth in that certain Settlement Agreement
with Americai Savings and Loan Association and Terrace Falls
Condominiums, dated October /*? , 1984, the undersigned Terrace
Falls Condominiums and its general and limited partners do hereby
agree to assign, transfer and convey to Margetts twenty percent
(20%) of whatever they, or any of them, may ultimately receive,
if anything, after the closing of the escrow under said Settlement
Agreement, in the way of an interest in the Terrace Falls
Condominiums Project or any portion thereof or in any proceeds
from the sale of the Project or of any unit or interest therein
or any right or option to acquire such an interest; provided,
however, the value of what is assigned to Margetts hereunder shall
not exceed One Hundred Thirty-Four Thousand Two Hundred EightyThree Dollars ($13^*283^00); and provided, further, that except to
the extent this Agreement may be construed as inconsistent with
or as a modification of the aforesaid General Release, in which
case this Agreement shall prevail, said General Release is hereby
reconfirmed in all respects by Margetts. ^!~Ssr,f4f>~ccu^^y- >s t^vf
SIGNED this /T

day of November, 1984. "
TERRACE FALLS < ONDOMI J11 MS
By:

Wells Stevens Enterprises
Its General Partner
By:

-^
X>-Wells Steven^
Its General Partner

Harold K. Beecher & Associates

-Harold K. Beecher, President

)

.

Harold K. B e e c h e r ,

,

.

_

•

_

.

individually

Wells S t e v e n s E n t e r p r i s e s
By:
I.'"WSlls S t e v e n s , Jr
General P a r t n e r
Stacey Deve

MARGETTS:

<rr*'
John L. M a r g e t t s ,

Individually
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FILED

JACK FAIRCLOUGH #1029
Attorney for Defendant
242 S. Sandrun Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
(801) 363 9688
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SAI T I OKE COUNTY IN THE STATE OMTAH

v£
<\°

\ ^

NEW WEST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION, a California Corp.,
successor-in-interest to AMERICAN
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSN., a California corporation,

ANSWER km C0UNTERC1 AIM

Civil No. 890901645 CN

vs.
JUDGE KENNETH RIGTRUP

JOHN L. MARGETTS,

Defei i d a i it.

In answer to the plaintiff's complaint the defendant admits, denies and
alleges as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
The complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
against the defendant.
SECOND DEFENSE
Defandant responds to
1.

rur idLK of knowledn

paragraphs of the complaint as follows:
information MJ! ( ;< i m ' !.,i Tiii'iu ,i lit I if 1 ,r, iu

the truth thereof denies.
2.

Admits 2, 3. <1. 5.

3.

Ad ?!', '

/ , »- u t j l lequs thi' ^".ir.i

! L !'" \ '.o^rl'-" >nui»\ *> Utah

partnership,was successor-in-interest to plaintiff; that Terrace Falls acts and
agreements are binding upon plaintiff; that Terrace Falls and plaintiff entered
into contemporaneous agreements with defendant which preclude plaintiff's recovery

herein and denies any liability under the condominium purchase agreement or the
settlement agreement.
4.

Admits 8. but alleges that he took occupancy of unit 413 in August, 1985

and he offered to pay dues and charges but plaintiff refused to accept the same
and plaintiff was not able to properly charge defendant such items until
September 1, 1987 when an owner's association was formed.
5.

Admits 9. but alleges that plaintiff and defendant negotiated over the

price, improvements, amount owed and other matters both before and after September
2, 1987 and the failure to close at all times was the fault of plaintiff.
6.

Denies 10.

7.

For lack of knowledge or information s u f f i c i e n t to form a b e l i e f as to

the t r u t h thereof denies 1 1 . 12.
8.

Denies 13. 14. 15. 16.

9.

For lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to

the truth of 18.
10.

As to paragraph 19. see 4. above.

11.

Admits receiving a notice to quit but denies all other allegations of

12.

Admits he has not vacated the unit but denies all other allegations of

20.

21. 22. 23.
THIRD DEFENSE
Defendant denies each and every

allegation of the complaint not specifically

admitted herein.
FOURTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff and Terrace Falls Condominium, a Utah partnership, acted at all
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pertinent times herein as successor-in-interest without a foreclosure and as
co-agents and co-principals with the same attorney representing them and all
agreements, promises, misrepresentations, fraud, duress and unfair dealing of
one is binding upon the other and plaintiff is liable for the conduct of itself
and Terrace Falls to defendant herein and based thereon plaintiff is not
entitled to recover from defendant.
FIFTH DEFENSE
On November 14, 1984 plaintiff, by and through Terrace Falls Condominium,
entered into an Agreement with defendant in which defendant was entitled to a
20% credit toward the purchase price of unit 413 of all sales of units up to
$134,283.00.

The sale of the first seven units provided a credit to the defen-

dant of a sum exceeding his purchase price.

Plaintiff did not choose to sell

any units until on or about April, 1987 and by September 1, 1987 seven units
were sold thus there is an accord and satisfaction as to any debts plaintiff
now alleges against defendant.
SIXTH DEFENSE
Defendant entered upon unit 413 at the instance and request of plaintiff.
Plaintiff on and after defendants occupation dismissed six security guards for
the premises.

Plaintiff also solicited defendant to sell units to friends and

defendant sold eight units, six of which were consummated.

Defendant is

entitled to a set off in an amount to be determined at trial for a reasonable
sales commission and for security guard cost savings plus interest to be
applied against any amount plaintiff might be entitled to herein against defendant.

Further, at the instance and request of plaintiff, defendant sought and

secured a buyer of the project for the plaintiff in the spring of 1986 in the
form of the Teamsters Union at a price determined by plaintiff as $15,000,000.00.
The sum of $150,000.00 or 1% of such total had to be paid.

Defendant personally

GOf'tZQ

paid the Teamsters $75,000.00 for half of the downpayment.

Defendant is

entitled to set off his said payment plus a reasonable payment for his efforts
in seeking to find a buyer for the project for plaintiff at plaintiff's request.
When plaintiff moved into unit 413 in August, 1985 said unit was not complete.
Plaintiff requested that defendant take occupancy despite its unfinished state
and promised to reimburse defendant for all completion costs.

Such costs

expended by defendant are approximately $16,000.00.
SEVENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff engaged in improper conduct amounting to duress to force
defendant to surrender his trust deed lien against the project's real property
and to enter into a condominium purchase agreement at an unfair price. Defendant
had effectively paid plaintiff by August, 1985 in excess of $500,000.00 for
unit 413.

Defendant was coerced into entering into a new condominium purchase

agreement November 14, 1984 through improper and untrue threats that defendant
had no valid trust deed lien on the real property of the project and as such
was worthless,defendant had no rights and had to enter into a new agreement of
purchase despite payment at that time of more than $400,000.00 in 1984.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff has waived and/or is estopped from asserting claims herein against
defendant.

The agreements relied upon by plaintiff in the complaint were

procured by fraud, deceit, coercion and duress from defendant.

In addition to

the duress referred to above plaintiff's counsel fraudulently represented and
promised defendant on and before November 14, 1984 that the 20% credit allowed to
defendant for unit sales up to $134,283.00 would insure defendant would have
unit 413 entirely paid for as to said balance from such credits.
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NINTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff's conduct herein discloses unfair dealing, over-reaching, duress
and fraud as well as a breach of fiduciary duties imposed upon banking institutions
with respect to those obtaining credit, contracts or services from such banking
institutions and plaintiff is precluded from recovery against defendant and
defendant is entitled to costs and attorneys fees herein.
TENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff is in breach of express or implied contracts and express or implied
warranties running in favor of the defendant and as a consequence the claims of
plaintiff herein are barred.
ELEVENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff made false and fraudulent misrepresentations of existing material
facts to defendant which defendant relied upon and which he had a right to rely
upon and without such misrepresentations defendant would not have signed the
documents plaintiff relies upon and hence plaintiff is barred from any recovery
against defendant herein. Such representations were made on and before November
14, 1984 to the effect that defendant had no valid lien on the real property
cone erned, he had no rights to a credit for $294,000.00 already paid which, with
an allowed inflation factor, meant by said date plaintiff owed defendant a credit
of more than $400,000.00 and that in any event defendant would have to make no
payments on the balance of $134,283.00 on unit 413 because all of such sum would
be paid out of 20% credit accruing to defendant out of unit sales, which by
September 1, 1987 exceeded said balance.
TWELFTH DEFENSE
The law firm of FABIAN & CLENDENIN, which brings this action against
defendant, represented the defendant with respect to his trade of a Park City
condominium to Terrace Falls and to defendant's filing of a lien against the
real property concerned herein.

Advise was given to defendant by Narrvel Hall,

Glen Clark and Jay Holdsworth during 1979 and 1980 in this matter and as a result
defendant obtained a trust deed and recorded same as a lien against the project
land arising out of his Park City Condominium trade to plaintiff. On said issues
defendant conferred with Mr. Hall on April 16 and 17, 1979 and with Glen Clark
and Mr. Hall April 28, 30, May 3, 4 and 7, 1979 and with Mr. Holdsworth on at
least two other occasions.
and others occurred.
fees.

The listing of appointments kept is not exhaustive

Defendant was billed for such appointments and paid the

On this basis the firm of Fabian & Clendenin should be disqualified from

proceeding herein against defendant and defendant moves for such disqualification.
WHEREFORE, defendant prays that the complaint herein be dismissed with prejudice and that he recover his costs and a resasonable attorneys fee and such other
and further relief as to the court appears proper.
COUNTERCLAIM
For counterclaim defendant alleges as follows:
1.

On or about October, 1980 defendant traded a Park City Condominium to

Garden Falls Condominiums, a Utah limited partnership, whereby defendant would be
entitled to a condominium in the Garden Falls Condominiums when the project was
completed.

Defendants condominium in Park City was taken at a value of $249,000.

00 and this was to be increased by an annual inflation factor.

This value had

grown to over $400,000.00 by November 14, 1984 and to approximately $500,000.00
by August, 1985.
2.

Condominium Sale Agreement. Exhibit 1 hereto.

Garden Falls Condominiums changed its name to Terrace Falls Condominiums

and on or about December 22, 1981 Terrace Falls gave a trust deed to defendant
covering the real property concerned herein.

Exhibit 2.

Said trust deed was

duly recorded by defendant as a valid lien against said property.

The trust

deed, recording and trade were undertaken upon advice from Fabian & Clendenin
in 1979 and 1980 as previously stated herein.

3.

Defendant is informed and believes and therefore alleges that plaintiff

had loaned Terrace Falls funds for the construction of the condominiums and
Terrace Falls defaulted on such loans.

Plaintiff determined in its own best

interests to not foreclose Terrace Falls rights and interests and those of
defendant but agreed to take deeds in lieu of foreclosure from Terrace Falls
leaving intact defendants lien rights on the property and defendants rights to
a condominium when the project was completed with payment for same being the
$294,000.00 paid in trade plus an inflation factor, which, by 1984, exceeded
a value of $400,000.00.
4.

Plaintiff is the successor in interest to Terrace Falls Condominiums

and is subject to all of defendant's rights against Terrace Falls.
5.

Plaintiff negotiated with defendant as the project was nearing

completion during September, October and up to November 14, 1984 as to what
rights defendant had to a unit in the project.
6.

On or about September 12, 1984 Lee Stephens and Gerald Snow, as counsel

for plaintiff met with defendant.
was not valid.

They told defendant that his trust deed lien

They told defendant that neverthless they would allow him a

credit on a condominium in the project of $30,000.00 which was 10 cents on the
dollar based on his delivery to Terrace Falls of his Park City condo worth $294,
000.00.

Defendant objected stating the trade was then worth $400,000.00 to

plaintiff and he should not have to pay anything further to get his unit and deed.
7.

On or about September 14, 1984 defendant met with plaintiff's counsel

at which time defendant was told they would give him a 50% credit for the
$294,000.00 already paid or $150,000.00 with no credit for interest or inflation.
Defendant was told that unit 413 was worth $284,293.00 and with such credit he
would owe a balance of $134,293.00.

Defendant objected saying he had already

paid $400,000.00 total and he should not have to pay anything further.
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8.

On or about September 14, 1984 plaintiff threatened defendant stating his

lien was not valid and if he wanted anything out of his trade of a condo to Terrace
Falls he would have to take the $150,000.00 credit and nothing more. Defendnt said no.
9.

On or about November 14, 1984 defendant met with plaintiff's counsel.

Defendant was given three documents to sign.

One was a general release which

absolved American, Terrace Falls and partners from any claim by defendant growing
out of the December 9, 1981 condo trade agreement. Exhibit 3.

Defendant was given

a Condominium Purchase Agreement to sign stating he agreed to buy unit 413 for
$284,293.00 less $150,000.00 and a balance of $134,283.00.

Exhibit 4. A

settlement agreement between American, Terrace Falls and defendant wherein defendant agreed to the $150,000.00 credit only.
said documents.

Exhibit 5.

Defendant refused to sign

Plaintiff's counsel then told defendant that, as an extra induce-

ment to get him to sign the three documents he would prepare a document giving
defendant a 20% credit on sales of all condo units not to exceed $134,283.00.
Plaintiff's counsel arranged to meet defendant later the same day to sign the 20%
agreement and the other three referred to herein.
10.

Later in the day on November 14, 198

counsel again.

defendant met with plaintiff's

Said counsel gave defendant an agreement to sign

which provided

defendant would receive credit for 20% of unit sales up to $134,283.00.
6.

Exhibit

When plaintiff's counsel handed this document to defendant he said you won't

have to worry about making any payments on the $134,283.00 balance stated for unit
413 because the sale of the first seven units by plaintiff would pay all of such
sum.

Based upon such representations to defendant the defendant signed all

documents at the same time including the gener al release, the condo purchase
agreement, the settlement agreement and the 20% agreement.
documents were signed by defendant they were not dated.

When these

On the defendant's

copy of the agreement as to the 20% plaintiff's counsel wrote the following:
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"Condominium Purchase Agreement of even
date with American Savings and Loan
Association not to be delivered to
Terrace Falls Condominiums unless this
Agreement is delivered to John Margetts
simultaneously."
Plaintiff's counsel prepared all of the documents and negotiated with
defendant.

Plaintiff's counsel later had the four documents executed by the

parties other than the defendant.

The defendant left Salt Lake City for

California on November 15, 1984 and he did not return to Salt Lake City until
November 26, 1984.

Plaintiff through counsel or otherwise wrote November 19,

1984 on the settlement agreement but it was blank as to date when the defendant
executed it. The dates of November 14, 1984 have been written by plaintiff on
the general release, the agreement as to 20% and the condo purchase agreement.
11.

Defendant executed the release, settlement and condo purchase

agreement in reliance on the plaintiff's representations as to the 20% credit
agreement.
12.

At the instance and request of plaintiff, defendant moved into unit 413

on or about August 25, 1985. Defendant met with plaintiff's representative in
August, 1985 and he was told that plaintiff would negotiate the sale price of
$284,283.00 because defendant pointed out units being sold by plaintiff then in
Salt Lake City were going for $150,000.00 or less and such units were as big as
unit 413.

Plaintiff not only said the unit price would be negotiated but that

it wanted him to move in and finish the unit.

Defendant has spent $16,000.00

to do so.
13. When defendant moved in plaintiff dismissed their six security guards as
not being needed any longer due to his presence.
14.

Plaintiff urged defendant to find buyers for units and he found eight,

six of whom consummated purchases.
15.

At the request of plaintiff defenant found a buyer for the project for

some $15,000,000.00 and snpnt $75,000.00 nf his own funds in Hm'nn sn.

ID.

5even units in tne lerrace ha u s condominium were sold from on or

about April, 1987 to September 1, 1987.

No effort was made by plaintiff to sell

units, except for the first three, until the former date.

The owner's associatior

was not formed until the latt er date and no dues or fees could be paid by
defendant prior to that time.

In any event plaintiff never demanded payment of

taxes, dues, rent or anything else until approximately January, 1988.
FIRST CLAIM
17.

Defendant has an agreement with plaintiff dated November 14, 1984

under which defendant is entitled to 20% of unit sales up to $134,283.00.

Such

sum was fully credited and earned by September 1, 1987. Plaintiff is therefore
bound under its agreement to deliver to defendant a deed

to unit 413 without

further payment.
SECOND CLAIM
18.

Defendant was induced by the fraud and dece ption of plaintiff to

surrender his lien rights in the property and to agree to pay an additional
$134,283.00 for unit 413 notwithstanding his prior payment for such unit
amounted to more than $400,000.00 as of November, 1984.
19.

Defendant relied upon plaintiff's misrepresentations and promises

as to existing material facts and was thus induced to surrender a valid lien
and to pay additional funds and without such misrepresentations and reliance he
would not have executed the release, settlement or purchase agreement.
THIRD CLAIM
20.

Defendant is entitled to credits, set offs and sums due from the

plaintiff in amounts to be determined at trial for security services rendered
to plaintiff from August, 1985 to the present;
of approximately $16,000.00;

for costs of finishing unit 413

for services rendered in finding six buyers for the
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plaintiff wherein such sales were consummated and for two others not consummated
through no fault of defendant and for services rendered in seeking and finding a
buyer for plaintiff for the entire project and for defendant's expenditure of
$75,000.00 in such endeavor plus interest.
WHEREFORE, defendant prays judgment against plaintiff as follows:
FIRST CLAIM
1.

For judgment requiring plaintiff to deliver

to defendant a warranty

deed without the payment of any further funds by defendant.
2.

For his attorneys fees and costs.

3.

For such other and further relief as to the court appears proper.
SECOND CLAIM

1.

For a judgment requiring plaintiff to deliver to defendant a warranty

deed to unit 413 without payment of further funds by defendant.
2.

For his attorneys fees and costs.

3.

For such other and further relief as to the court appears proper.
THIRD CLAIM

1.

For a judgment awarding to defendant the following:
a.

a reasonable sum to compensate defendant for his expenses in

finishing unit 413 of approximately $16,000.00.
b.
eight buyers
c.

a reasonable sum to compensate defendant for his efforts in finding
for plaintiff of units, six of which were consummated.
awarding to defendant the value of his services as to security

which services enabled the plaintiff to dismiss six security guards when defendant
took occupancy of unit 413.
d.

awarding to defendant the value of his services in finding a buyer

for the project and to compensate him for his loss of $75,000.00 plus interest
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in the process.
2.

for defendant's attorneys fees and costs.

3.

For such other and further relief as to the court appears proper.

Dated this 6th day of April, 1989.

Attorney for Defendant
>42 South Sandrun Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing answer and
counterclaim was mailed on the 6th day of April, 1989 to

W. Cullen Battle,

FABIAN & CLENDENIN, attorneys at law, twelfth floor, 215 South State St.,
Salt Lake City, Utah, U.S. postage prepaid.

ick Fairclough
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